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THe SARAJevO CeASeFIRe – ReALISM OR 
STRATeGIC eRROR BY THe CROATIAN 
LeADeRSHIP?
Davor MARIJAN*
The topic of this work is the post-war controversy centred on the view that 
the Croatian political leadership made an error in January 1992 when, 
with mediation by the United Nations, it agreed to and signed a ceasefire 
with representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Sarajevo. Those who 
hold this view are retired Croatian Army generals, who maintain that the 
war should have been continued during 1992, which would have achieved 
a military victory and the liberation of Croatia’s occupied and rebellious 
territories. Since these speculations are systematically promoted by 
influential media outlets, the author has attempted to respond to the extent 
allowed by historical scholarship.
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A ceasefire between the Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA) was signed between Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak and 
JNA General Andrija Rašeta in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, mediated by Cyrus 
Vance, the personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary General. The cease-
fire went into effect at 6:00 p.m. on 3 January 1992.1 This ended the first phase 
of the war in Croatia, which nobody with any credibility disputes today. Some 
controversy, however, has been created by the assertion that this was a strategic 
error, because Croatian forces were allegedly able to end the war by decisive 
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1 croatian Homeland War Memorial Documentation Centre (HMDCDR): Office of the 
Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces Main Staff, Order no. 622-1/91 of 3. 1. 1992; Central 
Military Archives of the Croatian Defence Ministry (hereinafter: SVA MORH), Croatian Army 
Main Staff papers (hereinafter: GSHV): SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/92-01/01, reg. 
no. 5120-01/22-92-2 of 3 Jan. 1992.; Ivo Perić, Godine koje će se pamtiti (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 
1995), p. 135.
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victory already in 1992, which would have spared Croatia all later warfare and 
also would have averted the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The key to this claim 
is the alleged halt of the Croatian Army’s liberation of western Slavonia on 3 
January 1992.2
The primary advocates of this interpretation are retired generals of the 
Croatian Army: Anton Tus, Martin Špegelj, Petar Stipetić and, to a certain 
extent, Imra Agotić. Until they transferred to the Croatian Army, they were on 
active service in the JNA (Agotić and Stipetić), or they had been retired for a 
time (Tus). These generals of the JNA, which Tus and Stipetić left to join Croa-
tia’s defence sixteen months after Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) opened a new chapter in Croatian history, gathered most recently to re-
iterate this assertion in May 2011, at the observation of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the establishment of the National Guard Corps (ZNG), essentially the 
Croatian Army. The journalist who presented them as the quartet that created 
the Croatian Army was not troubled by the fact that only Špegelj had partici-
pated in the creation of the ZNG, while the remaining three were in the JNA 
at the time,3 and based on the assumption that they created the armed force he 
also grave credence to their dubious claims. This is not the first time witnesses 
interpret history on the weight of their status rather than on the basis of the 
facts which they proffer to the public or, stated more simply, they are trusted 
not on the basis of sound arguments but on the basis of their rank as generals 
and even more so on the basis of ideological compatibility. Their assertions are 
welcome to like-thinkers as a confirmation of an arranged Serbo-Croatian war 
that was aimed at dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to this stance, the 
war’s scenario was outlined in Karađorđevo in March 1991 by Croatian Presi-
dent Franjo Tuđman and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.4
Speculation as to ‘what could have been’ is not the subject of an historian’s 
interest as it cannot be proven either way, so any discussion of the grounds 
(or lack thereof) for these assertions can only proceed indirectly. In order to 
obtain a reasoned response to the posed assertion but avoid speculation, it is 
necessary to answer questions such as: combat plans of the conflicting sides, 
conditions in the theatre of war at the end of 1991 and at the time when the 
Sarajevo Agreement was signed, organization and combat readiness of the 
warring sides and the international aspect of the war. I maintain that these 
are essential prerequisites for understanding the reason why the political 
2 Anton Tus, “Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do Sarajevskog primirja”, in: Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni 
i Hercegovini 1991-1995. (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Naklada Jesenski i Turk/Dani, 1999), p. 88; Martin 
Špegelj, “Prva faza rata 1990-1992: pripreme JNA za agresiju i hrvatski obrambeni planovi”,in: 
Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995., pp. 59-60; Martin ŠPEGELJ, Sjećanje vojnika 
(Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), p. 325.
3 Krešimir Žabec, “Tus, Stipetić, Špegelj i Agotić: Dan prije opsade Vukovara Tuđman je Imri 
Agotiću rekao: rata neće biti!”, Jutarnji list, 28 May 2011.
4 For more on this see Ivo Lučić, “Karađorđevo: politički mit ili dogovor”, Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest 35 (2003), no. 1: 7-36.
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leadership of Serbia and Croatia made and ratified the decision on a ceasefire 
which eventually became effective, in contrast to previous ceasefires.
Combat Plans:
The initiator of wartime events in the Croatian theatre of war was the Yu-
goslav People’s Army. In mid-August 1990 it prevented the Croatian police 
from quelling the nascent Serbian revolt. In the spring of 1991 it blocked entry 
to the so-called ‘Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina’ set up by the rebel 
Serbs. At the end of June it intervened in Slovenia, while in Croatia at the same 
time the rebel Serbs began to expand their ‘Krajina’ district to Banovina with 
an attack on the police station in the town of Glina.5 During the Slovenian 
campaign, the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia initiated the development of plans for force deployment.6 Since 
the Croatian leadership had forbidden armed engagement with the JNA, the 
latter intentionally provoked conflicts and abetted the rebels by allegedly sepa-
rating the conflicting sides. In late autumn, Croatia could no longer maintain 
this strategy and on 12 September 1991 it moved to blockade barracks and 
other facilities belonging to the JNA.7 The JNA responded with an offensive 
that had been systematically prepared since late July.8 The plan was to defeat 
Croatian forces and extract its own troops from Slovenia. The essence of the 
attack on Croatia was summarized in 1991 by General Veljko Kadijević, at the 
time the Yugoslav federal national defence secretary:
“- completely block Croatia by air and by sea;
“- link the attack routes by the JNA main forces as directly as possible 
to the liberation of Serbian regions in Croatia and JNA garrisons deep in-
side Croatian territory. To this end, sever Croatia at the following connective 
routes: Gradiška-Virovitica; Bihać-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; Mostar-
Split. Liberate Eastern Slavonia with the strongest armoured/mechanized 
group and then rapidly continue operations westward, regroup with forces in 
western Slavonia and then continue onward to Zagreb and Varaždin, and the 
Slovenian border. Simultaneously deploy major forces from the Herceg Novi-
Trebinje region to block Dubrovnik by land and to thrust into the Neretva 
Valley and thereby engage in joint operations with forces moving in along 
the Mostar-Split line;
5 Davor Marijan, Slom Titove armije: JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 1987.-1992. (Zagreb: Golden 
marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2008), pp. 228-229, 248-250, 263.
6 Branko Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija (Podgorica: CID, 2000), pp. 213-214.
7 D. Marijan, Slom Titove armije: JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 1987.-1992., pp. 278-279.
8 Jevrem Cokić, Početak kraja (Ruma: Srpska knjiga, 2008), pp. 217-218.
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“- after reaching specific facilities, secure and hold the border of the Ser-
bian Krajina in Croatia, extract the remaining JNA units from Slovenia and 
thereafter withdraw the JNA from Croatia;
“- 10-15 days will be required for mobilization and preparation of mo-
bilized and preliminarily mobilized units and their transport to the planned 
axes of engagement, depending on the degree of combat readiness of the 
units and their distance from the axes of engagement.”9
The operation in eastern Croatia, where the main forces were located, was 
supposed to commence on 21 September, but it was apparent already during 
the preparatory phase that this would not succeed.10 The group of leaders from 
Serbia, Montenegro, and the JNA – whom Borisav Jović referred to as the ‘sex-
tet’ (Milošević, Momir Bulatović, Jović, Branko Kostić, Kadijević and Blagoje 
Adžić) – were informed by General Adžić on 20 September that the mobiliza-
tion did not succeed and that they need “to implement a reduced plan”.11 the 
corrected plan was drafted in the days leading up to the end of September. The 
decision read: “move to offensive/defensive operations with this objective: to 
blockade parts of Croatia, inflict a decisive defeat against Ustasha forces in 
Dalmatia and eastern Croatia, and then stage armed strikes against vital fa-
cilities in Croatia to force its leadership to allow the withdrawal of our forces 
along the line bordered by threatened peoples”.12 After the first strike of the 
“reduced plan”, the JNA moved toward active defence, with the exception of 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik, by mid-October.13
Croatian Military Plans:
It would be pretentious to speak of Croatian combat plans in the literal 
sense of the term. Much has been written about the plans of Martin Špegelj, a 
retired general and the first Croatian defence minister. Their media presenta-
tion led to their acceptance by a part of the public as indisputable facts. During 
the period of the High Command of the National Guard Corps (Zbor narodne 
garde – ZNG), from May to mid-September 1991, there were two circulars 
which may be deemed guidelines for long-term combat operations, but not 
actual combat plans. The first, dated 17 May, was jointly signed by the defence 
9 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada (Belgrade: Politika, 1993),pp. 134-136.
10 Court files of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague 
(hereinafter: ICTY): Excerpt from Directive of 1st Military District Commander for operation 
in Slavonia, str. conf. no. 5-89 of 19 Sept. 1991; ICTY: Experiences in engagement of 1st Military 
District units in previous combat operations, February 1992.
11 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996), p. 386.
12 J. Cokić, Početak kraja, pp. 258-269.
13 Davor Marijan, “Sudionici i osnovne značajke rata u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1991.”, Časopis za su-
vremenu povijest 40 (2003), no. 1: 59-60.
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minister, interior minister and commander of the ZNG, which reflected the 
concept of defence at the time, involving engagement by all available forces 
of the police, ZNG and the general populace. The essence of this order was 
that the Serb rebellion was to be resolved without open confrontation with 
the JNA.14 The second was a command signed by the defence minister, dated 
12 September 1991, to block barracks and other JNA facilities, which signified 
the beginning of a brief but vital period of the war that led to a new balance of 
forces and, as a consequence, the subsequent outcome of events.15
More guidelines were generated during the period of the Croatian Army 
Main Staff, which is logical given the duration in question and the expanding 
war. The Main Staff was established at the time when the JNA’s offensive strat-
egy failed and after the first strike of its reduced plan had been endured. After 
8 October, the situation in the Croatian theatre of war was no longer as critical. 
The Main Staff soon realized that the pressure had abated, so on 12 October it 
released a circular indicating that a standing task was the implementation of 
active defence in order to gradually create the conditions “for taking the initia-
tive and enhancing our forces on the front, in our own rear positions and in the 
temporarily occupied territories”.16
Three days later, on 15 October, all operative groups were ordered to 
prepare and initiate more offensive operations in their zones of responsibility. 
The Operational Zones of Rijeka, Zagreb, Karlovac and Bjelovar were notified 
that the engagement of their forces was expected in the Operational Zones 
of Osijek and Split as well.17 After several general circulars, on 3 November 
the Main Staff ordered all operational command headquarters to immediately 
switch to combined operations and avoid passive defence.18 the circular 
issued by the chief of the Croatian Army’s Main Staff on 20 November had the 
elements of a short-term directive. The return of lost positions was sought in 
eastern Slavonia at positions south of Vinkovci on the Bosut River, as well as the 
prevention of penetration by the JNA south of Osijek. In western Slavonia, the 
Okučani-Lipik highway had to be severed, and enemy positions over the wider 
Okučani area had to be dispersed while the Jasenovac area needed to be taken. 
Two brigades were deployed from the Osijek zone for mop-up operations in 
14  SVA MORH, GSHV: MUP RH, MORH, ZNG Command cl. 8-01/91-01/03, reg. no. 512-01-
91-2 of 17 July 1991.
15 SVA MORH, Zagreb Operational Zone Command papers, Order cl. Dt-801-03/91-01/01, 
reg. no. 512-06-02-91-1 of 12 Sept. 1991; D. Marijan, Slom Titove armije: JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 
1987.-1992., pp. 278-283.
16 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/108, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91 of 12 Oct. 1991.
17 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/118, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 15 Oct. 1991.
18 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/129, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91 of 16 Oct. 1991; 
SVA MORH, ZOZZ: GSHV, Order cl. 804-01/93/62, reg. no. 5120-01-91-42 of 17 Oct. 1991; 
SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/206, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 3 Nov. 
1991.
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the Slavonian mountains. In Banovina, the task was to gain control of the wider 
area of Petrinja and create the conditions for penetration toward Glina and 
onward to Topusko. On the Kordun and Lika fronts, there were plans to move 
toward Saborsko and Slunj, extend the clearance of the Gacko and Lika fields 
and create the conditions for active operations toward Titova Korenica and 
Gračac. In northern Dalmatia, the plan called for severance of the road from 
Obrovac to Gračac and then the de-blocking of the Adriatic coastal highway 
and liberation of the Maslenica Bridge. In southern Dalmatia, the JNA forces 
had to be broken at Slano and its march toward Ston and Ploče had to be 
halted.19
Situation in the Theatre of War at the end of 1991 and at the Time of 
Signing of the Sarajevo Ceasefire
The JNA and the rebel Serbs made their greatest gains in the war against 
Croatia from late June to mid-September 1991. The municipalities with ma-
jority Serbian populations in northern Dalmatia and Lika were transformed 
into an entrenched stronghold from which the rebellion spread to surround-
ing areas. In northern Dalmatia, the JNA’s Knin Corps occupied the villages of 
Kijevo and Kruševo, the town of Drniš and the Maslenica Bridge. By applying 
pressure on coastal cities, Zadar first and foremost, it managed to arrange for 
the withdrawal of personnel and matériel from encircled JNA barracks. No 
wider battles were fought until 18-19 November, when the JNA attacked and 
seized the villages of Škabrnje and Nadin. After withdrawing from Šibenik, on 
31 December 1991 and 1 January 1992 the JNA attacked and occupied Novi-
grad and the villages of Pridraga, Paljuv and Podgradina. The JNA attempted 
to conduct mop-up operations on 3 January 1992 along the Suhovare-Poličnik 
and Smoković-Donji Zemunik lines. Limited progress was made along both 
lines as a result of dogged and decisive defence mounted by Croatian forces. 
After these efforts the JNA transitioned to a completely defensive mode.20
In the southern Dalmatian theatre of operations, on 1 October the JNA 
attacked the wider Dubrovnik region from the Popovo Polje area and Monte-
negrin territory via Prevlaka. By 5 October, Prevlaka has been “cleansed”, while 
on 15 October the town of Cavtat was occupied, and then Dubrovnik was at-
tacked. A month-and-a-half passed before the next major JNA success, when 
components of the Titograd Corps occupied Čepikuće on 24 November. Since 
then, the JNA more-or-less placed Herzegovina up to the Neretva River under 
its control. Its primary preoccupation was Dubrovnik, under whose walls it 
19 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf.  8/91-01/281, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91 of 20 
Nov. 1991.
20 Zdenko Radelić, Davor Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing, Stvaranje hrvatske države i 
Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), pp. 123, 143-145.
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had endured a public-relations disaster. After blockading Dubrovnik, the JNA 
attempted to break into the city in various ways. Besides depriving it of the 
provisions necessary for life, the JNA also shelled the city, which peaked on 
6 December 1991. At sea, the Yugoslav navy provided support to the JNA’s 
land forces in its attacks on Zadar and Dubrovnik. A more complex undertak-
ing, the attack on Split and the island of Brač via the Brač Channel inflicted 
considerable damage on the city on 15 November, but it ended in failure and 
withdrawal after Croatian artillery damaged several battleships that were par-
ticipating in the attack.21
On the Lika battlefield, the most important event occurred in September 
1991, when Croatian forces managed to defend the town of Gospić. By the end 
of the month, Croatian forces lifted the blockade of the Otočac-Žuta Lokva 
road, reinforced the defence of Otočac and moved forward in limited attacks 
and counterattacks in order to push Serbian forces from the Otočac environs. 
On 7 December, the JNA attacked and occupied villages in the Otočac Munici-
pality, and Korenica, Glibodol and, on 10 December, Čanak. In the counterat-
tack staged from 11 to 13 December, Croatian forces took back Čanak, liber-
ated Glibodol and took the village of Dabar on the route leading to Plaško.22
In the Karlovac-Kordun theatre of operations, armed conflict broke out 
in early September and escalated on 4 October when the JNA launched an 
attack on Karlovac and Duga Resa. The JNA’s plans to lift the blockade of the 
garrison in Karlovac failed, nor did the occupation of Turanj, which was a vital 
point of resistance for the Croatian defence. After 8 October, hostilities abated 
and a stalemate ensued in the Karlovac-Duga Resa portion of the front. The 
most significant event prior to the end of the year occurred on 4-5 November, 
when JNA forces with some mechanization broke out of their barracks in the 
Karlovac suburb of Logorište. After this break-out there were no major battles 
until the end of December, when the JNA repelled a minor Croatian attack 
on the barracks in Mekušje. Deep in Kordun, Croatian forces attempted to 
defend Saborsko and Slunj. They attempted to negotiate the surrender of Slunj 
without combat operations, after which attacks on the town and lone Croatian 
villages in Kordun commenced. After several unsuccessful attacks, on 25 Oc-
tober Hrvatski Blagaj was seized, followed by Saborsko on 12 November, Slunj 
on 17 November and Cetingrad on 29 November.23
By the latter half of September, the JNA and the rebel Serbs occupied most 
of Banovina and the Pounje (Una River Valley); Hrvatska Kostajnica fell on 
13 September, Topusko a day later, and Petrinja on 21 September. The JNA 
reached the Kupa River by the end of September. Its most extensive undertak-
ing was the attack, on 17-18 October, along the axis from the village of Slana, 
21 IBID., pp. 146-149.
22 IBID., pp. 140-143.
23 IBID., pp. 138-140.
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through Vratečko to Novi Farkašić, during which it endured a defeat and heavy 
losses in both personnel and combat mechanization. The last more serious at-
tempt by the JNA and the rebel Serbs was the unsuccessful attack on Sunja on 
2 November. In October the frontline stabilized, and the Kupa River served 
as the boundary, except in the area of the village of Nebojan, where Croatian 
forces organized a defence on the Kupa’s right bank. No progress was made in 
Banovina up to the Sarajevo Ceasefire, although at certain moments Croatian 
forces were more apt to take the initiative. The greatest challenge to the JNA 
and the rebel Serbs was Operation ‘Whirlwind’, a poorly prepared Croatian 
attempt to force a crossing of the Kupa toward Glina from 11 to 13 December, 
which after some initial gains and securing of a shallow bridgehead, ultimately 
failed, with loss of life and combat mechanization.24
In western Slavonia, the rebellion staged by local Serbs broke out in mid-
August 1991. Thanks to the intervention of the JNA’s Banja Luka Corps, the 
wider area around the town of Okučani became a protected zone for rebel 
Serbs, while the bridgehead at Stara Gradiška made it possible to introduce 
fresh forces for the Banja Luka Corps. The Serbian rebellion in Pakrac began at 
the same time, and it rapidly spread to the mountains of western Slavonia. After 
the failure of the JNA’s offensives, the mission of the Banja Luka Corps was to 
expand the territory around Okučani, Jasenovac and Hrvatska Kostajnica. The 
corps launched a new attack on 4 October, but it lost momentum by 8 October. 
Thereafter Croatian forces assumed the initiative. Soon two components 
crystallized on the battlefield: the western Slavonian mountains, where there 
was no JNA presence, rather only rebel Serbs, in the Bjelovar Operational 
Zone; and the Sava River area (Posavina) in the Zagreb Operational Zone. The 
Bjelovar Operational Zone was tasked with mopping up the western Slavonian 
mountains and defending Lipik and Pakrac. Intense battles around Lipik and 
Pakrac continued until the end of the year. Fortunes in the Lipik area were 
particularly precarious, until 7 December, when the town was placed under 
the control of Croatian forces. Campaigns were simultaneously conducted to 
clear the wider Bilogora of rebel Serbs and to push them back from Grubišno 
Polje and Daruvar. From 31 October to 3 November, the occupied territory 
of Grubišno Polje was liberated. At the end of November, forces from the 
Bjelovar Operational Zone, joined by forces from the Osijek Operational 
Zone, launched a coordinated operation to clear the Slavonian mountains of 
Papuk and Bilogora, which was completed by mid-December. The Posavina 
Operational Group was established in the Zagreb Operational Zone’s theatre 
of operations to defend the axes toward Novksa and Nova Gradiška. By 
reorganizing existing troops and with new reinforcements, the villages of 
Popovac, Lovska, Brezovica, Korita, Jagma, Gornja and Donja Subocka and 
Gornja Krička were liberated along the Novska axis from mid-November to 
9 December. The operation was preceded by pressing parts of the Banja Luka 
24 IBID., pp. 134-137.
Review of Croatian History 7/2011, no.1, 103 - 123
111
Corps in the direction of Nova Gradiška around the village of Medari on 12 
November.25
In the closing battle, in the final days of December 1991, the Main Staff 
undertook exceptional efforts to push to the Sava River by having the 127th 
Brigade from Virovitica thrust forward along the Bijela Stijena-Okučani line, 
while the Posavina Operational Group’s forces flanked it.26 The forces of the 
Bjelovar Operational Zone halted on the northern section of the battlefield 
due to the stiff resistance and mine fields they encountered.27 Progress was 
also limited in the direction of Novska due to a tenacious and effective defence 
mounted by the JNA, while on the Nova Gradiška axis the villages of Mašićka 
Šagovina and Širinci were liberated by the time of the Sarajevo Ceasefire on 3 
January.28
In eastern Croatia, the Serbian revolt began in May 1991. In early July, the 
JNA entered Baranja, while on 1 August it crossed the bridge over the Dan-
ube at Bogojevo and eliminated Croatian forces in Erdut, Aljmaš and Dalj. At 
around 22 August it had occupied Baranja. Vukovar was attacked on 25 Au-
gust. After the failure of the JNA’s offensives from roughly 20 to 22 September 
and its orientation toward Vukovar, the focus of the Croatian Army’s defence 
was to defend this town. Attempts were made to prevent it from being cut off 
from Vinkovci, and when this did not succeed, attempts were made to lift the 
blockade around it, which proved impossible. In the last days of Vukovar’s 
defence, on 15 and 16 November, the JNA crossed the Bosut River south of 
Vinkovci and occupied the villages of Lipovci, Apševci, Podgrađe, Nijemci and 
Donje Novo Selo. The conquest of Vukovar was exploited by the JNA to seize 
Stari and Novi Seleš and then Ernestinovo, south of Osijek, on 21 November. 
The village of Laslovo was taken on 24 November, which threatened Osijek 
and created the possibility of a push toward Đakovo. The final blow by the JNA 
came on 5 December, when it occupied Tenjski Antunovac, and a day later 
when it took Nova Tenja, while on 16 December it took Paulin Dvor.29
On 3 January 1992, Croatian forces had good reason to be satisfied with 
their positions only in western Slavonia. They had gradually begun to take the 
initiative in this area by mid-October and ultimately they held a considerable 
territory. But was this sufficient for a military victory on the battlefield? This is 
certainly a question that cannot be definitively answered. General Tus has no 
25 IBID., pp. 130-133.
26 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/438, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 28 Dec. 1991; 
SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 8/91-01/439, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 29 Dec. 1991; SVA 
MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/441, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 31 Dec. 1991; SVA 
MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/92-01/01, reg. no. 5120-01/22-92-1 of 1 Jan. 1992.
27 SVA MORH, GSHV: Bjelovar OZ Command, Extraordinary report Op. no. 276-1 of 28 Dec. 
1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: Bjelovar OZ Command, Daily report Op. no. 974-51 of 28 Dec. 1991.
28 Rudi Stipčić, Napokon smo krenuli … (Zagreb: Sveučilišna tiskara, 1996), pp. 77-79, 83-87.
29 Z. Radelić et al., Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat, pp. 125-129.
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doubt that the Banja Luka Corps was on the verge of defeat. Tus blamed the 
127th Brigade for this failure, although the archival documents do not clearly 
bear this out.30 In a command dated 1 January 1992, he concluded that af-
ter “exceptional results achieved after many days of combat operations by the 
units of the Bjelovar Operational Zone in the territory of Western Slavonia, 
there ensued … a relaxation and impermissible behaviour by a portion of the 
units and command staffs, whereby the entire operation to eject the Banja Luka 
Corps from the Posavina region was certainly threatened. The aggressor’s forc-
es were reinforced and consolidated, their positions were bolstered and they 
undertook organized offensives and threatened to re-take Lipik and Pakrac. A 
particular cause for concern is that the orders of higher command instances, 
including the Croatian Army Main Staff, are not being observed and executed, 
and inaccurate and falsified reporting has also emerged. All useful initiatives 
will always be endorsed by the Croatian Army Main Staff, but arbitrary action 
and failure to perform assigned tasks cannot and will not be validated”.31 It is 
uncertain as to whom he referred here, but the order makes it clear that an ad-
vantageous opportunity, if one had indeed existed, had been irretrievably lost. 
The successes achieved were less than expected, which in addition to the unfa-
vourable climatic conditions was also influenced by the then already difficult 
conditions in the Croatian Army’s units. The main force along the Novska axis 
and the driver of most successful operations, the ZNG 1st Brigade, had roughly 
40 percent of its troops out of combat formation, “which in large measure di-
minished the effect of offensive combat operations”. The condition of Croa-
tian Army brigades brought in from Samobor and Koprivnica was deemed 
troubling because both had a high number (700-800) of guardsmen who were 
on medically-certified sick-leave. Thus, these units were halved.32 In a status 
report submitted to the Zagreb Operational Zone Command Headquarters 
concerning the situation in which a Croatian Army brigade and battalion from 
Zagreb were sent to the Nova Gradiška axis, the commander of the local Croa-
tian Army brigade (also line commander) proposed their withdrawal, with the 
suggestion that their automatic and semi-automatic firearms remain and be 
distributed to local home guardsmen, while the axis would be reinforced with 
a Croatian Army brigade from neighbouring Slavonska Požega.33
The other problem with Tus’ view is the fact that he ignores the other side. 
Had the Banja Luka Corps been brought to the point of repelled across the 
Sava River? Broken groups of rebel Serbs on the northern section of the west-
ern Slavonia battlefield were subordinated to the Corps Command in the lat-
ter half of December, only to be disbanded and their personnel incorporated 
30 A. Tus, “Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do Sarajevskog primirja”, p. 88.
31 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/92-01/01, reg. no. 5120-01/22-92-1 of 1 Jan. 1992.
32 SVA MORH, Posavina Operational Group Command papers (hereinafter: ZOGP): Posavina 
OG Command, Report reg. no. 347/91 of 28 Dec. 1991.
33 SVA MORH, ZOGP: Report of 121st Brigade of 29 Dec. 1991 for 3rd OZ Command.
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into JNA units.34 In late December, the Corps was reinforced with two motor-
ized battalions of recruits from Serbia and Macedonia (from the 84th Motorized 
Brigade from Bitola and the 125th Motorized Brigade from Titova Mitrovica). 
Their arrival lifted morale and stabilized the frontline.35 At the turn of 1991 
into 1992, the 134th Light Infantry Brigade was brought to the western Slavonia 
theatre from Titovo Užice. According to Croatian intelligence reports, it ar-
rived on 31 December.36 The conclusion: Croatian forces had been halted due 
to exhaustion, a lack of ammunition and introduction of new JNA forces in the 
latter half of December, and not due to some sort of behind-the-scenes games 
being played by the political leadership. Had Tuđman intended to halt Croa-
tian forces, he could have done so by issuing a direct command to General Tus 
rather than doing so covertly through a brigade commander!37
The status differed in other operational theatres. The Croatian Army was 
in an entirely inferior position in southern Dalmatia, with the exception of the 
Neretva River Valley. In northern Dalmatia, the JNA was predominant but lack-
ing the forces to achieve operative success. A balance was established in the 
Lika, Karlovac-Kordun and Banovina operational theatres. The JNA held the 
line without great effort, while the most extensive battles – those on the Lika 
front – were waged for individual villages which changed hands a number of 
times, meaning that the reality was a tactical level of operation. In eastern Croa-
tia, the JNA’s status was best after it wedged Osijek in; by mid-December it also 
held this line without notable effort.
Several years ago, I wrote that “the Sarajevo Ceasefire … served as a tacti-
cal rest-period for the JNA and rebel Serbs, which was borne out by subse-
quent events. For Croatia, it was a strategic rest-period. Despite the customary 
view that the Sarajevo Ceasefire resulted from an agreement between Milošević 
and Tuđman in order to wage war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is not accurate. 
Namely, at the end of 1991, the Croatian Army had a tactical level, an opera-
tional level very rarely – only in western Slavonia it may be said, while its stra-
tegic level (Croatian Army Main Staff) was not functioning. At the end of 1991, 
the Croatian Army lacked ammunition to mount even a briefer defence, to say 
nothing of a more demanding operation”.38 This assessment is still valid now.
34 HMDCDR: Serbian Defence Ministry Operational Group of 16 Jan. 1992, Note, Current 
status and problems of Territorial Defence in western Slavonia.
35 ICTY: 5th Corps Operational Centre, Status in units conf. no. 13/1-394 of 30 Dec. 1991.
36 SVA MORH, ZOGP: Posavina ZOGP, Report reg. no. 351/91 of 31 Dec. 1991; VSA MORH: 
Order of 5th C. Command, Regular daily report str. conf. no. 18/13-11 of 11 Jan. 1992.
37 Based on transcripts of meetings between President Tuđman and the military leadership, it 
is more than obvious that Tuđman was the commander-in-chief and that Tus did not question 
this, which he later claimed. For example, HDA, UPRH: Minutes to 41st session of Supreme State 
Council of the Republic of Croatia held on 13 Dec. 1991; HDA, UPRH: Minutes to meeting held 
in Office of the Croatian President on 18 Dec. 1991.
38 Z. Radelić et al., Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat, p. 150.
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Combat Readiness:
Characteristics and capability of the Croatian armed forces: Was the Croa-
tian Army capable of a strategic offensive in January 1992; if so, where? In 
order to win a war, personnel, weapons, equipment, ammunition and money 
are needed. Out of these, Croatia stood best with personnel. With the excep-
tion of western Slavonia, Croatia was defended by local forces and the partial 
engagement of the active formations of the ZNG. The Croatian Army proved 
most manoeuvrable in western Slavonia. A high percentage of not recruited 
in the local area were concentrated here. From the end of September onward, 
forces from Zagreb, Kutina, Ivanić Grad, Samobor and north-west Croatia 
were deployed at the Novska axis of engagement. Besides local forces, there 
were troops from Slavonski Brod and, later, Zagreb on the Nova Gradiška axis. 
Above it was noted about their status at the very end of 1991 that they had 
achieved success in the western Slavonian mountains in combat with the rebel 
Serbs. In battles with the Banja Luka Corps, the success was not as great. And 
even that success was achieved by the ZNG’s 1st Brigade, at the time certainly 
the highest quality unit of the Croatian armed forces. Despite all of the weak-
nesses and shortcomings in the west Slavonian theatre of operations, it may be 
asserted that the Croatian Army had prospects for continuing the war if it had 
been at the same level in all remaining operational theatres. But it did not. All 
other theatres required reinforcements from the interior. But with the excep-
tion of the four active brigades, the levels that were later perceived simply did 
not exist at the time.
In eastern Croatia, the Main Staff only decided to reinforce the defence of 
Valpovo, Donji Miholjac and Našice and prevent a JNA offensive from Baranja 
across the Drava River in early November at the request of the operational 
command headquarters in Osijek and at the suggestion of chief armed forces 
inspector Martin Špegelj. The Croatian Army’s 104th Brigade from Varaždin 
was designated for this assignment on 5 November.39 Instead, on 10 November 
the Main Staff decided to bring the 105th Brigade from Bjelovar to the Valpovo 
area within a period of two days.40 This brigade was at the time the sole avail-
able unit of this capacity, for it had been withdrawn for reorganization after it 
had disintegrated in western Slavonia. It was late in arriving, and then it was re-
directed to lift the blockade of Vukovar and finally it rather haphazardly ended 
up defending the southern section of the Vinkovci Municipality. Weeks passed 
before it was filled in line with its structural capacity.41 Subsequently, following 
39 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/212, reg. no. 5120-01-91 of 5 Nov. 
1991.
40 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/236, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91 of 10 
Nov. 1991.
41 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 8/91-01/238, reg. no. 5120-01-91 of 11 Nov. 1991.; SVA 
MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/333, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 30 Nov. 1991; SVA 
MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 801-01/91-01/73, reg. no. 5120-34/22-91-1 of 12 Dec. 1991.
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an order dated 15 November, the bulk of the 101st Brigade from Zagreb was 
brought in to defend the wider Osijek territory on 20 November.42 During the 
battles for Tenjski Antunovac, most of the brigade withdrew and departed for 
Zagreb.43 In December this front was reinforced with an armoured-mecha-
nized battalion from Koprivnica. The personnel refused deployment, so the 
combat mechanization was distributed between three local brigades at the end 
of December.44
The western Slavonia theatre was the only one in which the operation of 
forces from other zones was recorded. Besides local forces, the ZNG 1st Brigade, 
the 104th, 105th and 117th Brigades, the Croatian Army’s 56th and 65th Battalions, 
and the 15th Mixed Anti-armour Artillery Regiment were deployed there. In 
November, the group was reinforced with the 151st Brigade, a battalion from 
the 153rd Brigade, and the 51st and 53rd Independent Battalions. The 121st Bri-
gade, and parts of the 108th, 99th and 198th Brigade and smaller detachments of 
the ZNG’s 1st and 3rd Brigades were deployed along the Nova Gradiška axis.45
In the Karlovac-Kordun operational theatre, the 103rd Brigade from Krapi-
na was deployed with a considerable problems, as well as the much better than 
the 150th Brigade from Zagreb.46 Forces from Rijeka were deployed in Lika, 
where the stationing of the 111th Brigade in the Otočac-Saborsko area took 
three months.47 In early December, the 128th Brigade from Rijeka was deployed 
in the Gospić area.48
These reserve brigades were brought in with great difficulty, and most ex-
hibited a series of shortcomings, so it may be concluded that the local brigades 
were generally in better condition, with greater value in combat. With the ex-
ception of western Slavonia and the 111th Brigade in Lika, all of these units 
42 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 8/91-01/260, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 15 Nov. 1991; SVA 
MORH, GSHV: Osijek Operational Zone Command, Report str. conf. no. 525-123-187 of 21 
Nov. 1991.
43 SVA MORH, GSHV: Osijek Operational Zone Command, Report str. conf. no. 525-123-244 
of 7 Dec. 1991.
44 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/354, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 4 Dec. 1991; 
SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. str. conf. 803-05/91-03/401, reg. no. 5120-26/22-91-1 of 25 Dec. 
1991.
45 R. Stipčić, Napokon smo krenuli, pp. 15-19, 30-31, 37-43, 60-62, 77.
46 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/231, reg. no. 5120-02/22-91-1 of 9 
Nov. 1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/366, reg. no. 5120-21-91-2 of 8 Dec. 
1991.
47 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/233, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 9 
Nov. 1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. str. conf. 81/91-02/30, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 12 Nov. 
1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/275, reg. no. 5120-01/22-91-1 of 18 
Nov. 1991.
48 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/335, reg. no. 5120-21-91-1 of 1 Dec. 
1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/366, reg. no. 5120-21-91-2 of 8 Dec. 1991.
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were engaged in defence tasks in the sense of combat operations, which are 
palpably simpler than offensives.
What was the status of the Main Staff as a body administering the war? 
After the ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army, the ZNG High Command 
was renamed the Croatian Army Main Staff on 21 September 1991, and on 
that day its top command personnel, i.e., the chief and two deputies, were ap-
pointed.49 The Defence Ministry’s order dictating this change in names was 
signed several days later.50 These changes were formal in nature and did not 
improve the quality of the command structure and strategic operations. The 
only difference was that the ZNG High Command followed the tradition of 
the Territorial Defence, while the Main Staff complied with the tradition of 
an operational military, both the older national guard and the JNA. Up to the 
Sarajevo Ceasefire, this body did the least of what it was, in fact, supposed to 
do: conduct the war. It was headed by a retired air force general of the JNA, 
Anton Tus. Although just as unqualified as the majority of the generals leading 
the JNA in the attack against Croatia, Tus played a considerable psychological 
role, for his cultured bearing and demeanour stood in stark contrast to most of 
his former comrades in the JNA. By the end of 1991, the Croatian Army Main 
Staff was filled with several generals and high officers of the JNA with the high-
est peacetime references, but since their chief of staff was a peacetime general, 
their expertise did not come to the fore. Moreover, at Tuđman’s insistence in a 
session held on 20 November, the Main Staff left Zagreb in December and set 
up a Forward Command Post in Našice in Slavonia.51 Its task was to function-
ally monitor the situation in eastern Slavonia and provide assistance to Croa-
tian Army command staffs and units.52
Besides general circulars sent to Operational Zone command headquar-
ters, which can all essentially be summarized as indicating that everyone was 
expected to make do to the best of their knowledge and ability, the Main Staff 
issued a single combat order, on which basis the unsuccessful crossing of the 
Kupa River was attempted in December 1991.53 Directives that would have 
specified plans over a longer term were not written. On Christmas Eve, 1991, 
49 SVA MORH, Defence Minister’s Office papers (hereinafter: KMO): President of the Republic 
of Croatia, Decision no. 1015/91 of 21 Sept. 1991; SVA MORH, KMO: President of the Republic 
of Croatia, Decision no. 1016/91 of 21 Sept. 1991; SVA MORH, KMO: President of the Republic 
of Croatia, Decision no. 1017/91 of 21 Sept. 1991.
50 SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Organization/formation Order cl. str. conf. 801-01/91-01/07, 
reg. no. 512-06-05-91-26 of 26 Sept. 1991.
51 Croatian States Archives, Zagreb, papers of the Croatian President’s Office (hereinafter: 
HDA, UPRH): Minutes to meeting held in the Office of the Croatian President F. Tuđman on 20 
Nov. 1991; SVA MORH, GSHV: Forward Command Post of Croatian Army Main Staff, Order 
cl. 8/91-01/312, reg. no. 5120-01-910-1 of 8 Dec. 1991.
52 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order cl. 8/91-01/312, reg. no. 5120-01-91-1 of 8 Dec. 1991.
53 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV, Order for offensive Op. no. 1, cl. str. conf. 8/91-01/134, reg. no. 
5120-02-91- of 17 Oct. 1991.
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after the Croatian Army’s inspectorate “toured all fronts, all brigades and inde-
pendent battalions, and Operational Zone command headquarters”, General 
Špegelj, the Croatian Army’s chief inspector, submitted a report to President 
Tuđman, Defence Minister Šušak and General Tus in which he made a damn-
ing assessment of the status and operation of the Main Staff and the Croatian 
Army:
“In combat operations, the fundamental weaknesses emerge already in the 
initial phase of the Main Staff ’s functioning. … The Main Staff does have 
control over all four elements of armed combat (personnel, combat matériel, 
time and space). The first element – personnel – is both objectively and sub-
jectively incapable of more complex combat operations. The military intel-
ligence service is disorganized, poorly conceived and only functions well in 
individual brigades on a case-by-case basis. Coordinated action is entirely 
absent, which according to this inspectorial assessment was the cause of se-
vere consequences in the operations of the 102nd Brigade, 52nd Independent 
Battalion, etc. It not sufficient to simply issue an order, rather it is also nec-
essary to ensure that said order is implemented by all participants without 
question, precisely in terms of aim, time and place. Coordinated action has 
been assessed as very poor. There is also poor coordination of operation be-
tween branches as well. Thus, artillery functions independently of infantry, 
independently of engineering, and so forth. As to the personnel element, an-
other aspect which must be underscored is the increasing and exceptionally 
dangerous emergence of growing distrust between professional officers and 
those who rose in actual armed combat. It is impossible to command if there 
is not even a minimum of trust, if insubordination comes to the fore and if 
the right to palpable risk is not exercised. … The second element of armed 
combat, matériel (weapons, gear, ammunition and other equipment essen-
tial to armed combat) is generally not under the Main Staff ’s control. The 
situation here is chaotic. The conceptual approach also contributes to this 
disorganization, as well as insufficient command activity in the utilization of 
manoeuvres and so forth with reference to concepts for conducting combat. 
To say nothing of banal matters such as the case that one unit has tank and 
artillery ordnance, but no tanks nor artillery, and vice versa. In this shortage 
of ammunition which (is becoming increasingly critical), balancing it on the 
fronts is of crucial importance. … Many negative consequences also ensue 
from the accumulation of orders one after another, without any of them be-
ing thoroughly executed. This compromises the chain of command, and cre-
ates the psychological impression of impotence. … The Croatian Army Main 
Staff must put itself in the position to command armed combat without ex-
ception, professionally, with greater involvement in the execution of its own 
orders and the orders issued by subordinates”.54
54  SVA MORH, GSHV: Croatian Army Chief Inspector of 24 Dec. 1991 for defence minister.
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There are no indications that Tus contested this report. He only wrote 
“draw lessons” on his personal copy.55 An extenuating circumstance for the 
Croatian Army Main Staff was the absence of a clear defence strategy. Tuđman 
had long believed – and this ultimately, albeit mistakenly, proved a winning 
combination – that war could be avoided. The massacre of Croatian police 
officers in Borovo Selo had a mitigating effect on the Croatian leadership 
and validated the orientation to refrain from hastily making long-term deci-
sions.56 Despite two arduous months in the summer of 1991 (July and August), 
Tuđman prevented the National Guard Corps and the police from engaging in 
open conflict with the JNA. Only hostilities with the rebel Serbs was allowed, 
which soon proved an impossible mission, for the latter never acted unless 
the JNA was nearby. It was precisely this policy of avoiding war, which in re-
gions such as Slavonia was often interpreted as a lack of courage and perhaps 
even cowardice if not treasonous, that gave Croatia its most valuable wartime 
ally – time, which was acknowledged by the JNA’s Admiral Branko Mamula.57 
This policy was also criticized from within circles deemed knowledgeable by 
the public. The best-known in the media was General Špegelj. Špegelj left the 
system due to Tuđman’s refusal to push Croatia into war.58 He spoke out in 
October 1991 with calls for the Croatian Army to launch a counter-offensive.59 
In November, Tuđman readmitted him to the service and appointed him the 
Croatian Army’s chief inspector. He reviewed the situation in Croatia’s armed 
forces while at this post, and, marshalling his emotions, he acknowledge in 
December that Croatia did not have the strength for a general turnaround and 
offensive action over a broader territory.60 This was additionally confirmed by 
his above-cited report, which he later “forgot” when writing a series of politi-
cally-charged assessments of wartime 1991.
Capability of the JNA: In the latter half of 1991, the JNA exhibited a series 
of weaknesses which brought into question its functioning as an army. The col-
lapse of the state was reflected primarily in its personnel. In this regard, it had 
begun to ideologically and nationally unravel since the campaign in Slovenia, 
when its most indoctrinated portion began to realize that its Yugoslavism was 
only declarative.61 From that point forward, the JNA together with compo-
nents of Territorial Defence forces functioned only with the gradual increase 
55 Ibid.
56 HDA, UPRH: Minutes to 5th session of Supreme State Council of the Republic of Croatia, 
held on 9 May 1991.
57 B. Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija, pp. 259-261.
58 M. Špegelj, Sjećanja vojnika, pp. 257-258.
59 Mladen Maloča, Darko Pavičić, “Hrvatska mora u ofanzivu”, Danas, 15 Oct. 1991, 21-23. 
Interview with General M. Špegelj.
60 Marko Marković, “Jastrebova ruka u hrvatskom džepu”, Slobodni tjednik, 4 Dec. 1991, 14-15. 
Interview with General M. Špegelj.
61 D. Marijan, Slom Titove armije: JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 1987.-1992., pp. 212-214, 439-441.
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of its reserve personnel, volunteers and dwindling number of troops on regular 
mandatory military service. It generally maintained forces of uniform strength 
on the frontlines and rotated reserve sections at intervals of slightly more than 
a month. This army had very low morale, palpably less than in the Croatian 
Army. But it had unsurpassable organizational superiority, for its units corre-
sponded to the status in the field. It had weapons and equipment which were 
sufficient to secure the status quo on the frontlines. This was retained until the 
late spring and, at places, the summer of 1992. For example, in western Slavo-
nia in the second half of May, the JNA’s 5th Corps was “transformed” into the 
1st Krajina Corps of the ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’. But it only 
withdrew upon the arrival of the UNPROFOR in the first days of July 1992.62
Balance of Forces:
The Croatian Army’s Strategic Offensive Directive was drafted by the Main 
Staff in January 1992. It was certainly written after 19 January, for its text refers 
to an order on that date. The Directive laid down the fundamentals of libera-
tion operations, the re-deployment of forces and an estimate of the balance of 
forces. It is logical to expect that the data for the Croatian Army were accurate, 
but not also those concerning the adversary. According to these data, Croatian 
forces had four active brigades and 60 reserve brigades with 155,772 members, 
216 tanks, 127 other combat vehicles and 1,108 different artillery pieces. The 
JNA was estimated as having 33 brigades, of which 19 were JNA and 14 Ter-
ritorial Defence, with 59,500 troops, 833 tanks, 522 armed combat vehicles, 
and 901 artillery pieces. The Croatian Army in eastern Slavonia had 39,018 
troops, while the JNA was estimated as having 12,000. In western Slavonia, 
the Croatian Army had 24,098 troops, while the JNA was estimated as having 
6,500. In Banovina, the Croatian Army had 29,138 troops, while the estimate 
for the JNA was 8,500. In Kordun, the Croatian Army had 19,660 troops, while 
the JNA had 5,500. In Lika, the Croatian Army had 14,820 troops while the 
JNA had 10,500. In northern Dalmatia, the Croatian Army had 19,600 troops 
while the JNA had 12,000. In southern Dalmatia, the Croatian Army had 9,378 
troops, while the JNA had an estimated 4,500 troops.63
According to this entirely faulty estimate, the Croatian Army everywhere 
had more troops, even in eastern and southern Croatia. There are accurate data 
for the numerical strength of the JNA in January 1992 for the forces encom-
passed within the 2nd Military District seated in Sarajevo. These were forces in 
western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun and northern Dalmatia. With reference 
62 ICTY: Order of 1st Krajina Corps, Regular combat report op. str. conf. no. 44-1/217 of 4 July 
1992.
63 SVA MORH, GSHV: GSHV Directive from 1992 for conduct of strategic offensive by Croa-
tian Army.
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to forces in eastern Slavonia, there are data from mid-November, and data 
from early December for southern Croatia. Based on the available documents, 
it is obvious that until the arrival of the UN forces in the summer of 1992, the 
JNA did not reduced neither its numerical strength nor deployed weaponry. 
Based on these data from November and December 1991 and January 1992, 
it may be concluded that in the war against Croatia, Serbia, via the JNA and 
Territorial Defence, had a minimum of 53 brigades – three of them armoured, 
seven mechanized, and 15 motorized and two mixed artillery brigade as back 
up. The numerical strength was approximately 145,059, with 1,100 tanks, 700 
other armoured vehicles and approximately 1,980 artillery pieces.64 the com-
bat potential of the JNA Air Force and Navy was not computed in these figures, 
but they certainly cannot be ignored.
The International Aspect of Conceding to the Ceasefire:
The collapse of Yugoslavia accompanied by war had great repercussions 
not only in Europe, but even farther afield. It was the greatest security chal-
lenge ever for the European Community, which proved incapable of resolv-
ing it. Several events occurred in the latter half of 1991 which influenced the 
course of the war. The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was held in The Hague 
and the UN Resolution of 27 September 1991 was adopted which instituted 
the arms embargo against Yugoslavia.65 Both of these events significantly in-
fluenced the decisions of the warring sides to accept the deployment of United 
Nations peacekeeping troops in Croatia. The impetus for their deployment 
came from Serbia, because it expected the peacekeepers to replace the JNA and 
preserve their conquests.66 Croatia, on the other hand, expected to establish 
control over its rebellious and occupied territories through the peacekeepers 
without armed conflict.67 The prerequisite for the arrival of the peacekeeping 
forces was the ceasefire signed in Geneva on 23 November.68
64 ICTY: 1st Military District Command, Inspection of forces str. conf. no. 1614-162 of 16 Nov. 
1991; ICTY: Working map of force deployment by 2nd Op. Gr. on 2 Dec. 1991; ICTY: Reference 
material for 5th Corps commander in Yugoslav Armed Forces Main Staff on 3 Dec. 1991; HMD-
CDR: 10th Corps Command, Inspection of numerical status of units, report str. conf. no. 3/15-36 
of 17 Jan. 1992; ICTY: 2nd Military District Command, Study on combat readiness of 2nd MD 
command HQs and units str. conf. no. 09/63-26 of 23 Jan. 1992.
65 Anđelko Milardović, Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske (Zagreb: Alineja, 1992), pp. 
156-157: UN Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 Sept. 1991; Michael Libal, Njemačka politika 
i jugoslavenska kriza 1991.-1992. (Zagreb: Golden marketing/Tehnička knjiga, 2004), pp. 67-93.
66 B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 407-411.
67 Report of F. Tuđman submitted to Croatian Parliament on 24 Dec. 1991. Published in: Franjo 
Tuđman, Zna se, (Zagreb: Izvršni odbor HDZ-a, 1992), pp. 187-204.
68 A. Milardović, Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske, p. 157: Geneva Agreement of 23 
Nov. 1991.
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Serbian Reasons for the Ceasefire:
The ceasefire, the signing of the armistice, and the decision on the de-
ployment of UN peacekeepers came at the initiative of Serbia. The Serbian 
aggression conducted by means of the JNA culminated in the latter half of 
August 1991 when it had its greatest impact in relation to deployed forces. 
It established a bridgehead from northern Bosnia into western Slavonia, oc-
cupied Baranja and occupied the village of Kijevo in Sinj’s hinterland. In the 
period from the latter half of September until 8 October, after the activation of 
its reserves and a portion of the Territorial Defence, it established a continu-
ous line more-or-less everywhere, cut off Vukovar, occupied Lipik, occupied 
Banovina, broke out to the entrance to Zadar and cut off Dubrovnik. This was 
its last major strike, after the failure of its offensives and reorganization of its 
troops. Historian Norman Cigar believed that this occurred after the conquest 
of Vukovar, about which he uncritically accepted the Croatian estimates of 
major losses for the JNA.69 I cannot agree with this. The conquest of Vukovar 
served as a condition for seeking the deployment of United Nations peace-
keeping forces. This did not make sense with Vukovar in the hinterland of the 
forward line to which the JNA had advanced. Borisav Jović testified that the 
Serbian leadership very realistically concluded in early October that not much 
more could be expected from military operations by the JNA than what had 
been achieved up to that point. On 6 October, he wrote that he had agreed with 
Milošević that the incomplete Yugoslav Presidency would accept the ceasefire 
proposal proffered by the European Community ministers, “with the objective 
of liberating and de-blocking the barracks in Croatia without casualties, and to 
orient the army to defend already liberated territories. Regardless of what the 
army thinks”. On the same day, this decision was in fact made by the truncated 
Yugoslav Presidency.70 They attempted to secure a political blessing for what 
had been accomplished by the JNA at the conference in The Hague. When this 
did not succeed, they undertook measures to have the UN protect their territo-
rial conquests and replace the JNA in the field so that it could be activated in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milošević and Jović concluded that that time had come 
for their territorial conquests to be protected by the UN “with its peacekeeping 
troops until a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis” not later than 2 Novem-
ber 1991.71 It is therefore apparent that pure pragmatism impelled the Serbian 
leadership to accept the ceasefire and the deployment of UN peacekeeping 
forces, rather than losses in warfare up to that point.
69 Norman Cigar, “Okončanje rata i hrvatski rat za nezavisnost: odluka u času zaustavljanja”, 
Erazmus (1997), no. 20: 37-38.
70 B. Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p. 392.
71 IBID., p. 406.
D. MARIJAN, The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or Strategic Error by the Croatian Leadership?
122
Croatian Reasons for the Ceasefire:
Like Serbia, Croatia had its own military and political reasons for accept-
ing the ceasefire agreement. At the moment when, at 6:00 p.m. on 3 January 
1992, the Sarajevo Ceasefire became effective, the Croatian Army only had a 
more favourable operative status in a single theatre of war, in western Slavo-
nia. Even here it did not have the strength to successfully carry out the order 
to pus the JNA from Slavonia and advance to the Sava River. Continuation of 
warfare implied new casualties as well. The option involving UN peacekeeping 
troops undergirded the – at that point – attractive idea of securing the restora-
tion of the occupied and rebellious territories to Croatian authority without 
warfare and casualties. The logistics arm of the Croatian Army also opposed 
the war option at the time, for up to that point it had to more-or-less make do 
with the ammunition needed to engage in combat. But offensive operations 
required far more ammunition than what Croatia had at its disposal. The Sara-
jevo Ceasefire was in fact awaited with depleted stockpiles.
The political reason was the arms embargo and the fact that Croatia was 
still formally a part of the disintegrated Yugoslavia. It was clear to the Croatian 
leadership at the time that the question of international recognition was cru-
cial to the survival of the state, including its further conduct of the war. An in-
ternationally recognized state had easier access to the world’s centres of politi-
cal power and arms dealers. This was yet another important reason for Croatia 
to accept the ceasefire and hope that the crisis could be resolved peacefully.
Conclusion
The assertion that the Croatian political leadership committed an error 
in January 1992 when, with the mediation of the United Nations, it accepted 
and signed the ceasefire in Sarajevo with representatives of the JNA, is rather 
preposterous. This assertion has been repeated in the media for years by cer-
tain retired generals of the Croatian Army who had transferred to it from the 
JNA. Both they and the media have the same objective, and that is to transform 
themselves (extras) into the protagonists of Croatia’s process of independence. 
Their interpretations may be categorized as hindsight, in which everything 
that occurred during the war is considered by not the situation in the theatre 
of war at the time the Sarajevo Ceasefire was signed. Besides ignoring this 
battlefield situation, they do the same with the political conditions and the 
overall status of Croatia at the time. From the standpoint of a professional 
historian, this artificially provoked controversy serves as yet more proof that 
history must be interpreted on the basis of documents and not the subsequent 
formulations of participants.
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Das Waffenstillstandsabkommen von Sarajevo – ein 
strategischer Fehler der kroatischen politischen Führung oder 
Realität? 
Zusammenfassung
Das Thema dieses Artikels ist die nach dem Kroatienkrieg entstandene 
Kontroverse darüber, dass die kroatische politische Leitung einen Fehler 
machte, als sie im Januar 1992 unter Vermittlung von Vereinten Nationen ein 
Waffenstillstandsabkommen mit den Vertretern der Jugoslawischen Volksar-
mee akzeptierte und in Sarajevo unterzeichnete. Diese Meinung ging von ei-
nigen in den Ruhestand getretenen Generälen der Kroatischen Armee aus, die 
meinten, dass die kroatische Seite anstatt dessen den Krieg weiterführen sollte 
und im Laufe des Jahres 1992 den militärischen Sieg erringen und die okkupi-
erten sowie die aufrührerischen Gebiete der Republik Kroatien befreien sollte. 
Da es sich um eine Spekulation handelt, die weder die damalige politische, 
noch die Situation auf dem Kriegsschauplatz berücksichtigt und die system-
atisch von einflussreichen Medien forciert wird, bemühte sich der Autor, eine 
Antwort darauf zu geben und zwar in einer der historischen Wissenschaft 
angemessenen Weise. Vom Standpunkt des professionellen Historiker aus ge-
sehen, zeigt diese provozierte Kontroverse, dass geschichtliche Ereignisse in 
erster Linie auf Grund von Dokumenten interpretiert werden sollen und dass 
die von Teilnehmern erst später formulierten Standpunkte nur mit besonderer 
Vorsicht benützt werden sollen.
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